Prior to noncooperative choices of abatement of a transboundary pollutant, a technologically advanced country considers making an unconditional transfer of abatement technology to its less-advanced rival. Even though technological aid is given unconditionally and abatement strategies are chosen noncooperatively, in a number of plausible circumstances, a transfer of a superior control technology will induce Pareto-superior pollution abatement.
Introduction
Many believe that the transfer of "clean technologies" to less-advanced countries will be an effective, even necessary, policy prescription to confront international environmental problems (French, 1992; Heaton et al., 1991; Levy et al., 1993; Pearce, 1991; von Moltke, 1992) .1 Guaranteeing easy access to new technologies is often justified as a costeffective way to reduce international emissions of some pollutants. For example, concerning the policy debate about confronting global climate change, there appears to be significant potential for improving the efficiency of energy use in the developing world. Transferring energyefficient technologies to less-advanced countries may be a relatively inexpensive way to reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases (De Canio and Lee, 1991; Coppel, 1994) . Facilitating the transfer of clean technologies has also been made a concrete part of a number of interna-1 "Clean technologies" genetically refer to a wide range of devices, management techniques, and materials that are used to control emissions or produce goods and services with lower environmental impacts. tional environmental agreeme vention on Hazardous Wastes" assistance to less-developed pa ments to the Montreal Protoc Layer," industrialized parties t technologies (substitutes for c to developing countries on "fa 1991; Parsons, 1993) .
Despite the consensus that te effective policy instrument in i economic and game-theoretic l conflict resolution lacks a rigo tial.2 Hence, in this paper we technological aid to its strateg abatement of a transboundary
We will restrict our attention to situations in which the countries do not expect to come to a binding agreement to control emissions of the pollutant, so the game is completely noncooperative. Furthermore, as is often assumed in the literature on international environmental problems, reducing emissions of the transboundary pollutant is modeled as a contribution to a pure public good (international environmental quality).3 We shall consider a two-stage game. In the first stage of the game, the technologically advanced country may make an unconditional gift of a superior abatement technology to the other country.
In the second stage, the countries noncooperatively choose their abatement strategies.4 In this context, we will find that a number of plausible 2 Some examples of theoretical analyses of international environmental conflict and resolution include Barrett (1994) , Black et al. (1993) , Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) , Hoel (1991) , Mäler (1991) , Sandler and Sargent (1995) , and Welsch (1993) . None of these papers consider the role of technology transfer.
3 The theory of private contributions to public goods is relevant here. A typical list of citations will include Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Cornes and Sandler (1986) among many others. Recent contributions include Varían (1994) , Konrad (1994) , and Buchholz and Konrad (1995) . The assumption that abatement is a contribution to a pure public good is appropriate when considering problems like ozone depletion and global climate change which are generated by uniformly mixed pollutants. Hoel (1991) , Welsch (1993) , and Buchholz and Konrad (1994) assume a uniformly mixed pollutant. If the pollutant is not uniformly mixed the damage inflicted on a particular country depends on the source of emissions. For examples, see Maler (1991) who models European acid rain and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) .
4 As a model of a prior strategic investment to affect the outcome or a future noncooperative game, the paper is related to the industrial-organization circumstances exist under which the advanced country will be able to use technological aid to its strategic advantage. Furthermore, when the advanced country transfers technology to the other, it induces Paretosuperior abatement choices. Thus, the results of this paper lend some theoretical support to the widespread belief that transferring superior abatement technologies can be an effective policy instrument in international environmental relations. However, because we also find that there are equally plausible situations in which a Pareto-superior outcome cannot be induced, policy recommendations about technological aid in a noncooperative setting should be considered cautiously.5
As a model of actions taken about abatement technology prior to abatement choices, this paper is closely related to a recent paper by Buchholz and Konrad (1994) , in which they consider each country's adoption decision prior to abatement choices. They find that countries face a rather perverse incentive to adopt inferior technologies (in the sense that they involve higher unit abatement costs than other available technologies) so that they can precommit themselves to lower abatement in the future.6 This paper differs from theirs because they do not consider technology transfer and we will not consider individual commitments to an abatement technology. Interestingly, the strategic aspects of the two approaches are quite similar. A technologically-advanced country has the incentive to transfer a superior technology for the same reason a country is motivated to choose an inferior technology for itself; both actions tend to shift the burden of reducing emissions onto others. However, as we shall find, the welfare and environmental consequences of the two types of actions are very different.
A relatively general version of the game is described in Sect. 2. This section provides a number of interesting results about the effects of transferring a superior technology on second-stage abatement choices literature on strategic investments to forestall entry or expansion of a rival firm. (Typical references include Dixit, 1981 , Fudenberg and Tiróle, 1984 , and Gilbert, 1989 5 Since this paper assumes that the advanced country is restricted to giving its rival a superior abatement technology, it does not consider the possibility of mutually advantageous trades in which the less-advanced country purchases a superior abatement technology. Allowing such trades should result in a larger set of Pareto-improving transfers.
6 They also find that a nation is motivated to adopt inferior abatement technologies prior to a cooperative agreement because doing so will improve its bargaining position. In a related paper, Copeland (1990) finds that, in the absence of international cooperation, countries may have a strategic incentive to degrade common property resources to influence the behavior of rival and a characterization of the s a clearer picture of equilibrium Sect. 3. In this section we will se an optimal transfer may be qu 2 The Game
The players of the game are two countries, which we shall call the North and the South. (Imagine benevolent governments acting on behalf of their citizens.) Suppose throughout that the North possesses superior abatement technologies. In the first stage of the game, it may give a superior abatement technology to the South to influence the outcome of the second-stage abatement game. The transfer of a superior technology is completely unconditional -the South does not pay a price for a superior technology, nor is it obligated to a particular abatement choice in the second stage of the game. A subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game consists of a technology transfer in the first stage, and noncooperative abatement choices in the second stage, conditional on the first-stage transfer.
Technology Transfer
Let the total cost of *n units of abatement by the North be the monotonically increasing and strictly convex function cn(*n)-The South's abatement cost function is assumed to be cs(*s, 0 which is increasing at an increasing rate in its abatement xs-The variable t is taken from a continuous, nonnegative index of technologies defined on the closed interval [0, /°]. The index orders the technologies according to their effectiveness in reducing the South's abatement cost so that cs(xs, t ) is decreasing in t. We will also assume that the South's marginal abatement cost is decreasing in t. Therefore, dcs/dt < 0 and d2cs/dxsdt < 0.
We will say that ť is superior to (or more effective than) t" if ť > t".
Let t = 0 denote the technology that the South possesses at the beginning of the game, and let t° denote the best technology that the North possesses. In addition, the North possesses, or can develop at some cost, technologies that are inferior to t°, but superior to technology 0. The open interval (0, t° ) contains these technologies, each of which the North may choose to give to the South. which we shall assume is increasing at a decreasing rate in total abatement and increasing at a nonincreasing rate in private consumption. We shall also assume that consumption of environmental quality and the private good are weakly complementary. That is, d2u¡/dXdy¡ > 0, where X = jcn + *s. These assumptions along with those concerning abatement costs are sufficient to guarantee the results of this section.7
Let the price of private consumption be unity and let country V s exogenously given national income be m(. Thus, the North's budget constraint is win = w + cn(jcn) and the South's is ms = ys + cs(*s> t). A subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game requires that second-stage abatement choices form a Nash noncooperative equilibrium that is conditional on the first-stage technology transfer. Given a technology that the South actually implements, a second-stage equilibrium is a pair of abatement choices which solve the following optimiza- To analyze how the first-stage technology transfer affects secondstage abatement choices, let us consider the Nash best-response functions of the countries and focus on unique, interior second-stage equilibria. For the North the best-response function is jcn = 0 nUs) which is implicitly defined by the first-order condition 9mn/9*n = du^/dX -(dux/dyn)cfN = 0. The best-response function of the South is xs = 0s C*N» t) which is implicitly defined by dus/dxs = dus/dX -( dus / dys)(dcs/dxs) = 0.8 The best-response functions have the following characteristics: d<M*s) w t m 90s Un, 0 _ , , m ^ 90s Un, 0 n -axs ox N ot (2) 7 With d2Ui/dXdyi > 0, it can be shown that environmental quality and private consumption are strictly normal goods. That is, holding abatement of the other nation constant, an increase in income will be allocated to increased abatement and increased consumption of the private good.
8 Of course, the best-response functions also depend on income levels, but these are ignored because they are not needed for our purposes. Lastly, one can use (3) and (4) to obtain the marginal re between total abatement and the first-stage transfer:
Taken together, (3), (4), and (5) give us the equilibriu quences of transferring a more effective abatement technol a superior technology lowers the abatement cost (total and of the South, it is willing to take on a larger abatement bu response, the North reduces its abatement, but the overall effec total abatement increases. (The effects of transferring a mor technology ť > t are illustrated in Fig. 1 .) These are essen strategic aspects of technological aid when two governments lateral pollution problem in a noncooperative fashion. By inv the abatement capability of another, a technologically advanc can shift a portion of the burden of controlling emissions a itself. Furthermore, such an investment leads to better envi quality in both nations.9 9 Note that these results do not depend on the relative prefer environmental quality in the North and South, nor do they depen It is instructive to compare these results to those of Buchholz and Konrad (1994) . They found that countries are motivated to adopt inferior abatement technologies to shift the burden of providing pollution control onto others. Adoption of a technology with higher unit abatement cost precommits a country to lower abatement in the future. (They assume constant marginal abatement costs.) In equilibrium, others respond with higher abatement. The essential aspect that drives the burden-shift is that the relative unit-abatement costs change. Adoption of an inferior technology implies that others have relatively lower unit-control costs, and hence, in equilibrium, they end up taking on a relatively larger abatement burden. A similar thing happens when one country provides another with a superior abatement technology; the donor nation's marginal control costs increase relative to the other's. In equilibrium, this induces a shift of the abatement burden onto the less-advanced nation. Though the burden-shifting characteristic of the two actions are the same, the environmental and welfare consequences are very different. Buchholz and Konrad find that environmental quality is unambiguously worse when nations strategically adopt inferior control technologies, while we ambiguously better when a sup a less-advanced nation. Not sur technology adoption has adver will be able to characterize situ Pareto-superior outcomes.
Since the underlying motivatio trol costs relative to the South adopt an inferior control tech tify will exist in spite of the N technology to the South. That multaneously transfer a superi inferior technology for itself. incentive except to note that th enjoy broader political support nology. Thus, even though it an inferior technology, it may more complete model of strate environmental relations would allow for both actions.
In another related paper, Maijit (1990) finds conditions under which a technologically advanced firm can sell a superior production technology to its less-advanced Cournot rival. With linear demand and constant marginal production costs, it is straightforward to show that the strategic effects of a technology transfer are similar to those in the publicgoods context; namely, output of the advanced firm decreases, output of its rival increases, and total industry output increases. However, in the duopoly situation, the transfer of a superior production technology without compensation would lead to lower profit for the advanced firm and higher profit for the less-advanced firm. Clearly, a superior production technology will never be freely given. If a transfer is to take place the less-advanced firm's gain in production profit must be large enough so that it is able to compensate àie advanced firm for its loss of profit. In contrast, in the public-goods context the welfare of the North (excluding the costs of the transfer) must increase because environmental quality improves and it is able to reduce its emissions control. Hence, if the transfer cost is low enough, the North will always have an incentive to transfer a superior control technology without compensation from the South.
However, the South is not necessarily better off with a superior technology. Consider the South's equilibrium welfare u'(t) = us(x£(t) + x£(t), m s -es (xg(t), 0). To see why the South may be worse off with a marginally superior technology, differentiate Ug(t) and use the firstorder condition dus/dxs = dus/dX -(dus/dys)(dcs/dxs) = 0 to obtain d u$(t) _ dus 3ms 3^s d¿ dX d t dys dt Note that du^(t)/dt has the same sign as dus/dX dx * des 3ws/3;ys dř 3í Equation (6) shows that the South experiences a cost and a benefit from the transfer and adoption of a superior control technology. Recall that the transfer of a superior technology allows the North to reduce its emissions control. The first term in Eq. (6) is the value that the South places on the North's reduced emissions control. The second term is the reduction in the South' s abatement costs due to adoption of the superior technology at its equilibrium abatement choice. Thus, if adopting a superior technology induces a relatively small reduction in the South' s abatement costs, but a relatively large reduction in the North's equilibrium abatement which the South places a high value on, it may be worse off with a superior technology.
We shall give the South the ability to refuse a superior technology if its welfare is not improved. Let us assume for simplicity that if the South is offered a superior technology t > 0, it either adopts t or stays with its own technology 0. This assumption implies that receipt of some technology t does not make other technologies available to the South that are inferior to t , but superior to technology 0. Given some transfer f , denote the adoption strategy of the South as i (t) and note that i0 if uUt) < «*(0),
i(t ) = ' [t if U*s(t) > W*(0).
Clearly, this strategy does not involve any noncredible threats. Therefore, the North must account for this adoption strategy when it chooses a technology to transfer.
First-stage Technology Transfer
The North chooses a technology transfer in the first stage of the game by looking forward to the second-stage outcome. Transferring a technology has a cost which may include the costs of providing technical assistance for the installation and maintenance of a new abatement technology; expenditures to find and develop new technologies, or to modify existing technologies to South, and perhaps receipts that nology is simply given away. In bears all the transfer costs, tho ment between the nations to sh agreement would result in a large Suppose that the cost of transf w(t) which is increasing at a non costly, the North will only tran adopt, and thus, the North's tran this constraint in mind, the optim max«Ntó(0 +*s(0, ffiN - (7) s.t. t e [0, f°], t = i(0 .
A first-stage transfer t* that is a solution to (7) and the second-stage abatement pair [jcj^(r*), jc|(/*)] form a subgame-perfect equilibrium for the entire game.
Note that if the solution to (7) is such that t* > 0, it must be a Pareto-improvement on the no-transfer case. Clearly, if t* > 0 is a solution to (6), the North must be better off than in the no-transfer case. Also, since a solution t* > 0 must satisfy the South's adoption requirement, it must also be better off than in the no-transfer case.
We conclude: If the North finds it optimal to transfer a superior technology to the South, doing so will induce Pareto-superior pollution control.10
Observe that this result is due to the structure of the game, not to any particular assumption about preferences or abatement costs. technological aid that may be a significant consideration for policymakers in advanced countries. Namely, even though the utility and cost functions may be simple and well-behaved, the objective function for the North in the first stage of the game can easily be quite complex with boundary maxima and/or multiple local maxima. Thus, to actually identify a globally optimal transfer, policymakers in advanced countries may face the difficult task of estimating transfer costs and the benefits of pollution control; including, of course, the strategic interdependence of control policies, over the entire range of possible transfers.11
Assume that the utility functions are the following: Let us assume throughout that national incomes are sufficient to guarantee that the game admits equilibria in which private consumption by both countries is strictly positive. This assumption and quasilinearity of the utility functions lets us ignore national incomes since they will have no bearing on optimal choices. Then, the counterparts 1 1 This problem is related to the well-known policy problem of nonconvexities that arise in externality-control problems. See Baumol and Oates (1988) for an introduction, and Helfand and Rubin (1994) It is shown in Appendix 2 that u$(t) is strictly increasing in more effective technologies. Thus, for this example, if the South' s equilibrium abatement choice is expected to be positive, it will adopt any superior abatement technology that the North chooses to transfer.13
To this point we have a very well-behaved system. The second-stage equilibrium choices of pollution control are unique, and, assuming as we do that they are interior choices, the South will adopt any superior 12 Note that the North's equilibrium abatement is decreasing in t, while the South' s equilibrium abatement is increasing in t. Furthermore, it is easy to show that total abatement is increasing in t. These confirm our results from Sect. 2 that transferring a superior technology in the first stage allows the North to shift a portion of the burden of abatement onto the South and induces greater total abatement.
13 Even though the South' s adoption strategy does not bind the North s choice of aid in this example, recall that this result cannot be generated in more general versions of the game. environmental quality is at least as strong as the South's, u^(t) and d«j^(ř)/dř are both strictly convex for all t e [0, ( a -1)/jt]. (This result is also derived in Appendix 2.) Then, since w{t) is convex (perhaps weakly), the North's objective in the first stage of the game, wj^(i) -w(t), will likely lack the concavity property necessary for easy identification of an optimal transfer.14 Now, let us identify the possible subgame-perfect transfers for this example. To simplify matters, let us assume that the cost of transferring superior control technologies w(t) is increasing at a linearly increasing rate, and that there are no fixed costs associated with transferring technology. (Of course, the presence of fixed costs can be another source of multiple local maxima.) Then, there are five cases to consider. The first three are illustrated in Fig. 2 , which assumes that d«j^(0)/d/ > u>'( 0). In case A, the marginal transfer cost function w'A(t ) cuts d«£,(í)/dí once from below. In this case, the subgame-perfect transfer is r3, a relatively modest investment in the South's abatement technology. In case B, the marginal transfer cost function w'B(t) cuts d«^(ř)/dř twice, once from below and once from above. In this case, there are two locally optimal transfers, t 2 and t°. (Note that i1 identifies a local minimum.) In case C, the marginal transfer cost function w'c(t) lies everywhere below dM^(ř)/dř, so the subgame-perfect transfer is the best abatement technology t°.
Cases B and C illustrate two important considerations for policymakers in the North. First, because of the strict convexity of u^(t), there are plausible circumstances under which it is optimal for the North to provide its best control technology so that the countries' abatement capabilities are equalized. Second, case B illustrates the possibility of two locally optimal transfers, one of which is the transfer of the best technology. The presence of multiple local maxima is problematic because if the North considers only incremental investments from the status quo 14 This is true even though the underlying utility and abatement-cost functions are quite simple. With more complicated utility and cost functions, we should expect that the North's first-stage objective will be even more complex. (t = 0), a simple "marginal benefit equal to marginal cost" rule will lead it to settle on a moderate transfer like t2 when a more radical investment like transferring its best technology may be the global optimum. The fact that the optimal transfer may be die best technology and the possibility of multiple local optima seem to imply that policymakers in the North need to be able to estimate the net benefits of pollution control and transfer costs over the entire range of potential transfers. Clearly, this will be a difficult task.
The two remaining cases are illustrated in Fig. 3 , which assumes dnj,(0)/df < u/(0).15 In case D, the marginal transfer cost function w'D(t) lies everywhere above du^CO/df. Here, any improvement in the South's abatement technology is too costly, so in the subgame-perfect equilibrium, no transfer takes place. In case E, the marginal transfer cost function w'E(t) cuts du£,(f)/d/ once from above, so the subgame-perfect equilibrium consists of the transfer of the best abatement technology or nothing at all. Case E is interesting because modest transfers are too costly, but equalizing the abatement capabilities of the two nations may be a Pareto-improvement. Again, a search only over incremental improvements in die South's abatement capability may lead policymakers 15 These cases also apply when diij,(0)/d/ = w'(0). in the North to discard technological aid as too expensive, when in fact the truly optimal policy is to make its best abatement technology available to the South.16 selves for the same reason. But, th welfare and environmental conseq trol technology, though rational f unambiguously leads to a Pareto-i environmental quality. In contrast optimal to invest in the abatement induce Pareto-superior control and However, we have also identified ical aid that should be cautionary countries. In some cases, a less-ad off by adopting a superior control t nological aid will just be too costl nation expects from improved env choose a lower level of control doe ring a superior technology. Furthe example that identifying an optim policymakers in advanced countrie over the full range of possible trans timal transfer that is not a global investments in the abatement cap them to discard technological aid a investment may be optimal.
There are a number of policy-rel should be considered. For exam player game we have ignored the f advanced nations may consider pol of the potential donor nations is gives a superior technology to a l has an incentive to freeride on the Furthermore, because of the freer incentive to cooperate in the transfe It seems likely that the incentive important policy considerations in This work should also be extende tial of technological aid when par agreement to limit emissions of a whether an advanced country can favorable negotiating position or international environmental agree the strategic use of technological a eventual agreement, paying particiila ronmental consequences. Furtherm environmental agreements includ transfer, researchers should begin to think seriously about how these mechanisms ought to be designed. These issues (and probably others) should be pursued in future work to provide policymakers with a more complete characterization of the potential of technological aid in international environmental relations.
Appendix 1
Our purpose is to show the following: à<t>N(xs) ^ 90s(*n, 0 , , m and . 90sC*n, t) In addition to the assumptions listed in (Al), we also have dcs/dt < 0 and d2cs/dxsdt < 0. Then, d2us/dxsdt > 0 which with 32ms/9jc| < 0 implies 3</>s/9ř > 0.
Appendix 2
Given some transfer from the first-stage that the South adopts, and assuming an interior second-stage equilibrium, the first-order conditions to the optimization problems given by (8) 
